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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RICHARD ANTHONY NICHOLS, : Case No. 20020686-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to the State's arguments in its response to Richard Nichols9 (Nichols) 
opening brief, Nichols' convictions should be reversed on appeal because: (A) the 
evidence was insufficient to support Nichols' convictions, (B) public policy requires that 
Nichols' convictions be reversed, and (C) the trial court abused its discretion by usurping 
the role of the prosecutor during its interrogation of witnesses. 
ARGUMENT 
A. NICHOLS' CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THERE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS 
Contrary to the State's argument, Nichols' convictions on counts 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 
and 19 should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to 
support these convictions. 
First, counts 6 and 7 should be reversed for insufficient evidence. In counts 6 and 
7, the State claims the evidence established that Warren Dinter (Dinter) placed his 
vehicle "on consignment with" Nichols. Aple. Brf. at 16. This is false. Although Dinter 
left his vehicle at Remember When, he did not ever consign it to Remember When. R. 
202:42-43. The State also claims there is no testimony describing Nichols9 voice; thus, 
Albert Sanchez's (Sanchez) testimony that he spoke to Nichols on the phone is credible, 
even though Sanchez could not identify Nichols' voice. Aple. Brf. at 18. However, John 
Neeway (Neeway) testified that Nichols' voice was "very distinctive" because it was 
"[d]eep, res[o]nating, would fill a room." R. 202:89-90. Therefore, because Sanchez 
spoke to the same voice during both phone conversations but could not identify Nichols' 
voice, it is likely that Sanchez did not talk to Nichols but to Mike Gent (Gent), who 
admitted he spoke to Sanchez over the phone. R. 203:280. Finally, the State argues this 
Court should assume Sanchez, if asked, would have testified that Gent redid the 
paperwork for tax purposes. Aple. Brf. at 18-19. However, the absence of testimony, if 
anything, suggests Sanchez would not have testified as such. See, e.g., Tisco 
Intermountain & State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n. 744 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Utah 1987) 
(holding "it cannot be assumed that facts exist" in the absence of evidence). Thus, 
Gent's testimony is the only evidence to support his story that he redid Nichols' 
paperwork and the trial court expressly found that it would not rely on Gent's testimony 
without corroboration. R. 203:281-82; 204:473,489. 
Second, count 10 should be reversed for insufficient evidence. In count 10, the 
State claims Nichols misquoted Neeway's testimony. Aple. Brf. at 22. However, 
2 
Neeway's full statement, like the portion quoted in Nichols' opening brief, shows 
Nichols called Neeway to inform him of a pending sale and to request a copy of the title 
so he could proceed with the sale.1 The State also claims Nichols is asking this Court to 
accept his testimony over Neeway's about the date on which Nichols called Neeway. 
Aple. Brf. at 20. However, the trial court itself rejected Neeway's testimony. Neeway 
testified that Nichols called him on May 17,1999, not on May 12 as the trial court 
suggests in its findings, and the trial court rejected May 17 as a feasible date.2 R. 202:90-
91, 97-100; 204:479-80. Therefore, the trial court rejected Neeway's testimony about the 
date of the phone call. Accordingly, the only evidence remaining was Nichols' testimony 
that he called Neeway on May 8, 1999, and Neeway faxed the title four days later; 
Neeway's testimony that he previously stated in a letter to the Attorney General's Office 
that Nichols called him on May 8,1999; and the date on the faxed title that reads May 
12, 1999. R. 202:98-100; 203:362-63. This evidence supports the argument that Nichols 
called Neeway directly following the sale of the vehicle to tell Neeway there was a 
pending sale and he needed a copy of the title to proceed. 
Third, counts 12 and 13 should be reversed for insufficient evidence. In counts 12 
1
 Neeway's full statement reads, "That there was a sale-that somebody was 
interested in purchasing the vehicle, that he needed the information off the title to secure 
documentation to sell it. Something along that line." R. 202:90-91. 
2
 The trial court incorrectly found that Neeway testified Nichols called him on 
May 12, 1999. R. 204:479. Neeway testified that Nichols called him on May 17, 1999. 
R. 202:90-91, 97-99. The only reference to May 12,1999, was the date on the faxed title 
which Neeway expressly rejected as a plausible date. R. 202:98-99. 
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and 13, the State argues Nichols cannot cite Paul Nipper's (Nipper) affidavit because it is 
not in the record. Aple. Brf. at 24-25; see. Addendum A. However, Nichols can cite 
Nipper's affidavit because this Court granted a motion to supplement the record on 
appeal with Nipper's affidavit on June 5, 2003. See Addendum B. 
Finally, count 19 should be reversed for insufficient evidence. In count 19, the 
State argues Nichols' conviction should not be reversed because the evidence was 
"sufficient to prove [Nichols'] complicity in the fraudulent scheme." Aple. Brf. at 12. 
However, to prove Nichols was guilty of racketeering, the State had to first prove 
Nichols was guilty of a pattern of unlawfuil activity, meaning it had to prove Nichols was 
guilty of the communications fraud counts. Because the evidence was insufficient to 
support Nichols' convictions of communications fraud, as discussed above, it was also 
insufficient to support his conviction of racketeering. 
B* NICHOLS' CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THEY 
ARE AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY 
The State argues that Nichols' convictions are not against public policy because 
the evidence of Nichols' "participation in the scheme was more than a general 
knowledge of the financial problems the dealership was experiencing." Aple. Brf. at 13. 
To support its argument, the State cites Gent's testimony that Nichols, Gent and John 
Douglas (Douglas) attended a meeting in January 1999 where they decided to "sell more 
cars and use the proceeds from those sales to pay for delinquent obligations." Id. 
However, Gent's testimony is the only testimony about a specific January meeting and 
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the trial court expressly found that Gent's testimony, without corroboration, was not 
credible. R. 204:473,489. The other testimony at trial suggested that Remember When 
was not experiencing financial difficulty in January 1999 so there was no reason for a 
meeting in January to discuss financial difficulties. R. 203:398; 204:462-63. 
Moreover, in making its argument, the State cites Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-803 
(1998) for the idea that the consignee should receive commissions not profits for the sale 
of a consigned vehicle. Aple. Brf. at 13. It is important to emphasize that the consignee 
discussed in section 41-3-803 is the dealership, not Nichols. See. Utah Code Ann. § 41-
3-802 (1998). By citing this statute, the State attributes to Nichols far more 
responsibility than he actually had. Nichols was a salesman at Remember When. R. 
203:402; 204:458. He was not an owner or operator. R. 203:290-91; 204:451-53. He 
did not handle titles or payments to consignors. R. 204:452-55,458,467. Most 
important, he did not benefit from the illegal activities engaged in at Remember When. 
R. 204:467,473. To convict a salesman for selling cars without evidence that he did so 
with direct knowledge of illegality or for personal gain through illegal means runs 
against public policy. Therefore, contrary to the State's argument, Nichols' convictions 
should be reversed because they are against public policy. 
C. NICHOLS' CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE 
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY USURPING THE ROLE 
OF PROSECUTOR DURING ITS INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES 
"Rule 614 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows the court to 'interrogate 
5 
witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.'" State v. Bovatt 854 P.2d 550, 553 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). The trial court, "within 
reasonable bounds," may "ask questions of any witness who may be on the stand for the 
purpose of eliciting the truth, or making clear any points that otherwise would remain 
obscure.'" State v. Gleason, 86 Utah 26,40 P.2d 222,227 (Utah 1935). However, the 
trial court "should not indulge in extensive examination or usurp the function of 
counsel." Id Instead, "sincerity and fairness should characterize [it]s every word and 
action." Id, 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by usurping the role of prosecutor 
during its interrogation of witnesses because it: (1) elicited evidence in disregard of its 
previous rulings, (2) elicited inadmissible evidence, and (3) ignored Nichols' objections. 
1. The Trial Court Erred By Eliciting Evidence In Disregard of Its Previous 
Rulings. 
The State argues the trial court did not err by eliciting Cruisin' Classics evidence 
because such evidence was relevant to defendant's credibility. See Aple. Brf. at 27-28. 
However, the trial court's error was not that it elicited irrelevant evidence, but that it 
elicited evidence in violation of its own ruling. 
The rules of evidence exist to "secure fairness in administration" and develop the 
"law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly 
determined." Utah R. Evid. 102. In keeping with this purpose, a trial court, once it has 
made an evidentiary ruling in a trial, must enforce that ruling consistently. See State v. 
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Stone, 629 P.2d 442,445-46 (Utah 1981) (suggesting error where trial court sustained 
objection that appeared "inconsistent with [its] earlier decision"); State v. Malone. 2002 
N.C. App. LEXIS 1990, *15 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2002) (No. COA01-262) (holding 
trial court erred by agreeing to instruct jury that exhibits were illustrative but then giving 
instruction that exhibits were substantive). Specifically, a trial court cannot elicit 
testimony during its interrogation of witnesses that the prosecution, based on previous 
rulings, could not have elicited. See. United States v. Victoria, 837 F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 
1988) (holding it was "every bit as improper, and probably more so, for a trial judge" to 
elicit testimony that the prosecution could not have elicited); Williams v. United States. 
93 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1937) (holding trial court erred by "propounding leading 
and suggestive questions that would not have been permitted to the prosecutor himself1). 
In this case, the trial court erred by making an evidentiary ruling and excluding 
itself from enforcement of the ruling. During the prosecution's case, the trial court 
stopped Nichols' cross examination of Bryce Greer (Greer), even though the State had 
not objected, and ruled of its "own volition" that evidence about Cruisin5 Classics had no 
"bearing on this case" and would not be considered "at all" in the court's decision. R. 
203:440. Later, Nichols objected to the State's cross examination of Douglas because 
the State was eliciting Cruisin' Classics evidence. R. 204:458-59. In response, the trial 
court asked the State whether it was "referring to Cruisin' Classics or . . . Remember 
When" and caused the State to reword its question to avoid eliciting Cruisin' Classics 
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evidence. R. 204:459. Then, just minutes after reiterating its ruling that Cruisin' 
Classics evidence was inadmissible, the trial court itself violated this ruling by 
questioning Douglas about Cruisin' Classics.3 R. 204:465-66. 
Furthermore, the "error should have been obvious to the trial court.11 State v. 
Adams. 2000 UT 42,^20, 5 P.3d 642. The trial court was obviously aware of the 
existence of the ruling because it made the ruling twice, the second time just moments 
before it violated the ruling by questioning Douglas about Cruisin' Classics. R. 203:440; 
204:458-59. The trial court was also obviously aware of the scope of the ruling because, 
just moments before it elicited evidence about Cruisin' Classics, it caused the State to 
reword a question to avoid any reference to Cruisin' Classics at all. R. 204:459. 
Moreover, it was obvious that Douglas was testifying about Cruisin' Classics. Although 
Douglas did not name Cruisin' Classics as the partnership he testified to, he must have 
been talking about Cruisin' Classics because Douglas himself owned Remember When 
3
 The relevant part of the trial court's interrogation of Douglas reads as follows: 
THE COURT: What was Mr. Nichols' position after January of 1999 at 
Remember When? 
THE WITNESS: It is my understanding that first of all he was the sales manager 
for Mr. Gent and then became a partner with Mr. Gent. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, lack of foundation and hearsay. 
THE COURT: How did you determine that? 
THE WITNESS: I was told by several people that were involved with the 
business and by the landlord that Mr. Nichols and Mr. Gent were forming some type of 
partnership. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, same objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm talking before June 13th of 1999. 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
R. 204:465-66. 
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so Gent and Nichols could not have formed a partnership at Remember When. See R. 
203:256, 290, 336-37; 204:459,471. 
Finally, the trial court's error was harmful. Error is harmful where "the likelihood 
of a different outcome [in the absence of the error is] sufficiently high [so as] to 
undermine confidence in the verdict." Adams. 2000 UT 42 at ^ 20 (quotations and 
citation omitted) (alterations in original). In this case, the error was harmful because it 
caused the trial court to reject Nichols' theory at trial. Nichols' trial theory was that Gent 
and Douglas committed the acts of communications fraud for which he was charged. 
Through Cruisin' Classics evidence, Nichols sought to show he did not know Gent was 
committing fraud until he became Gent's victim. However, the trial court stopped 
Nichols from presenting this testimony and expressly disregarded it. R. 203:440. Later, 
the trial court elicited other Cruisin' Classics evidence showing Nichols and Gent were 
partners and relied on this evidence. R. 204:465-66,477. If the trial court had admitted 
all Cruisin' Classics evidence, it would have seen Nichols was one of Gent's victims. If 
it had admitted no Cruisin' Classics evidence, it would not have known Gent and Nichols 
were partners.4 Either way, the outcome likely would have been more favorable to 
Nichols. 
4
 At most, the trial court would have known Gent worked for Nichols briefly but 
Nichols fired him. See R. 203:411-13, 429-31,434-36. 
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2. The Trial Court Erred By Admitting Inadmissible Evidence During Its 
Interrogation of Douglas. 
The State argues the trial court did not err by admitting inadmissible evidence 
during its interrogation of Douglas because the trial court "appears to have disregarded 
the testimony" and there was other evidence to support the trial court's finding that 
Nichols was not credible. Aple. Brf. at 28-29. However, this argument addresses only 
the harm element of plain error and it fails to show why the trial court's elicitation of and 
reliance on inadmissible evidence was not so harmful that it must have affected the 
outcome of the trial. 
A trial court, when it interrogates a witness, is bound by the same rules of 
evidence the prosecution and defense are bound by. See Utah R. Evid. 1101 (stating that 
the rules of evidence "apply to all actions and proceedings in the courts of this state" 
unless they fall under an enumerated exception). Consequently, a trial court cannot, 
during its interrogation of a witness, elicit evidence that the prosecution could not have 
elicited if it had been performing the interrogation. See United States v. Victoria. 837 
F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding it was "every bit as improper, and probably more so, 
for a trial judge" to elicit testimony that the prosecution could not have elicited); 
Williams v. United States. 93 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1937) (holding trial court erred 
by "propounding leading and suggestive questions that would not have been permitted to 
the prosecutor himself1); State v. Cox. 255 S.E.2d 660, 662 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) 
(reversing because trial court used its interrogation to emphasize hearsay evidence). In 
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this case, the trial court erred by eliciting inadmissible evidence during its interrogation 
of Douglas. During the trial court's interrogation, Douglas explained that he had 
obtained the information for part of his testimony from "several people" and "the 
landlord." R. 204:465-66. Instead of striking the testimony Douglas had obtained from 
these unspecified people, the trial court continued its interrogation and left the hearsay 
information on the record as evidence. 
Moreover, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. Hearsay is "a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). 
Under this definition, all information that Douglas received from "several people" and 
"the landlord" is hearsay. R. 204:465-66. "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided 
by law or by [the Utah Rules of Evidence]." Utah R. Evid. 802. The hearsay evidence in 
this case does not fit any hearsay exception and the State has not argued that it does. 
Thus, the hearsay testimony that Douglas offered was "obviously inadmissible." See 
Cox, 255 S.E.2d at 662. Further, even if the evidence was not readily recognizable as 
hearsay, Nichols objected to the testimony and explained to the court that the evidence 
was hearsay and lacked foundation. Once Nichols objected, the trial court was put on 
notice that it was eliciting inadmissible evidence and should have ruled on the objection 
and cured the record of the inadmissible evidence. See Id. 
Finally, the error was harmful. In Cox, the appellate court determined the trial 
11 
court's focus on hearsay during its interrogation was "so prejudicial" that it must have 
affected the result. Id. at 663. Similarly, in this case, the trial court's error was so 
prejudicial that it must have and did affect the result. Because the rules of evidence 
prevented the State from eliciting the testimony the trial court felt was necessary to make 
the State's case, the trial court usurped the role of prosecutor and elicited the necessary 
evidence itself by violating the rules of evidence. Then, regardless of its inadmissible 
nature, the trial court left the evidence on the record and relied on the evidence in its 
findings.5 R. 204:477. Moreover, although Cox involved a jury trial, the same result 
should be reached here because the trial court expressly relied on the hearsay evidence in 
its decision. See Id.6 
5
 The relevant findings of the trial court read as follows: 
There is also a problem of credibility as it relates to [] 
Gent. Mr. Nichols testified that he didn't like him, didn't 
want to socialize with him, wanted nothing virtually to do 
with the man, didn't recognized [sic] him as his superior. But 
yet the testimony is, by Mr. Douglas, that when Mr. Douglas 
indicated to . . . Mr. Nichols[] that Mr. Gent would be the 
operator, no problem was ever expressed. Mr. Nichols 
continued to send all problems with respect to titles, et cetera 
to Mr. Gent and seemed to act as though he were superior in 
his dealings with him. Furthermore, after the business was 
closed down on June 13th, he opens up another business and 
Mr. Gent is either an employee or partner, depending on who 
you believe, but they worked together in another business. 
R. 204:477. 
6
 The Utah Supreme Court says evidentiary rulings "are not of such critical 
moment" in bench trials because it assumes the trial court "will use his superior 
knowledge as to the competency and the effect which should be given evidence." Super 
Tire Mkt.» Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132, 136 (Utah 1966). However, 
12 
3. The Trial Court Erred By Ignoring Nichols' Objections. 
The State argues the trial court did not err by ignoring Nichols' objections because 
it "addressed the objections by asking follow-up questions." Aple. Brf. at 28. However, 
the court did err because, by ignoring Nichols' objections, it appeared to be favoring the 
prosecution. 
When a judge is presiding over a bench trial, it must maintain an appearance of 
neutrality. See State v. Mellen. 583 P.2d 46,48 (Utah 1978) (holding "a judge should 
maintain an attitude of neutrality"); Cunningham v. Housing Auth., 764 F.2d 1097, 1101 
(5th Cir. 1985) (holding trial court did not err in ordering deposition because no jury was 
present and trial court maintained impartiality). Accordingly, if a trial court chooses to 
interrogate a witness, it must not appear to favor the prosecution during its interrogation. 
See United States v. GuglielminL 384 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1967) (reversing because 
trial court conveyed impression of guilt to jury by engaging in "persistent questioning" of 
defense witnesses and making "numerous comments to defense counsel"); United States 
v. Beatv. 722 F.2d 1090, 1095 (3d Cir. 1983) (reversing because trial court conveyed 
impression of guilt to jury by vigorously engaging in defendant's case but leaving 
prosecution's witnesses with "complete freedom from hostile interruption"); United 
States v. Singer. 710 F.2d 431,436 (8th Cir. 1983) (reversing because "the jury could 
this assumption does not apply here because the trial court, by ignoring its superior 
knowledge about the rules of evidence, was able to admit and rely on inadmissible 
evidence. R. 204:477. 
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well have inferred that the judge was siding with the government" by his frequent 
questions and comments that favored the prosecution). In this case, the trial court erred 
because it abandoned the appearance of neutrality during its interrogation of witnesses. 
Nichols objected three times during the trial court's interrogation of witnesses and the 
trial court ignored all three objections. See. R. 203:309; 204:465-66. By ignoring 
Nichols' objections and proceeding as if Nichols had not objected at all, the trial court 
lost the appearance of impartiality. Instead of appearing to be a neutral arbitrator, the 
trial court appeared to be a supporter of the prosecution that was admitting inadmissible 
evidence because it had already decided Nichols was guilty.7 
Further, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. Nichols' objections 
are clear on the record. See R. 203:309; 204:465-66. The trial court could easily have 
paused its interrogation to rule on Nichols' objections immediately or to inform Nichols' 
that it would take his objections under consideration. Instead, the trial court repeatedly 
ignored Nichols' objections and continued its interrogation. 
Finally, the error was harmful. Prejudice is presumed where the defendant is 
denied "an impartial trial judge." State v. KelL 2002 UT 106,^ }15 n. 2, 61 P.3d 1019 
(citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997) (listing six errors that defy 
7
 This case is not like State v. Larsen, 849 P.2d 129, 130 (Ida. 1993) (holding trial 
court implicitly ruled on "asked and answered" objections by telling witness she could 
answer one question and rephrasing the other). Here, the trial court did not implicitly 
rule on Nichols' objections because it did not acknowledge the objections, rephrase the 
questions, or strike the inadmissible testimony. R. 203:309; 204:465-66. 
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harmless-error analysis)). Here, harm should be presumed. The trial court abandoned 
the role of adjudicator and left Nichols5 trial without a judge. It did not matter whether 
Nichols objected because there was no judge making evidentiary decisions. 
Accordingly, inadmissible evidence was admitted regardless of objection and relied on 
by the trier of fact because the evidence was part of the record. See R. 204:477. 
CONCLUSION 
Nichols requests this Court to reverse his convictions for five counts of 
Communications Fraud and one count of Racketeering. 
SUBMITTED this jd* day of June, 2003. 
L d ^ S E P P J ^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies of 
the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 
IP**- day of June, 2003. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
Jim * Ruth Ludwig, AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL NIPPER 
Plaintiffs, 
David E. Nipper, Wayne Curtis, 
Kenneth Eskelson, Douglas 
Eskelton, Jake Watson, Robert B. 
Norton, and Doca 1-100 
(Involuntary Plaintiffs) 
v. 
John Douglas dba T-D 
Enterprises, LLC, aka 
Remember When Classic Civil No. 990407964 
and Performance Motor Cars; Judge Dcnbc P. Lindberg 
Richard A. Nichols, individually: 
David E. Nipper, individually; and 
Western Surety Company, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
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PAUL NIPPER, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows: 
1.1 am over 18 years old. 
2.1 am the son of David Nipper, a party to the instant action. Because I acted as agent for 
David Nipper during much of the pertinent time period that forms the basis for David Nipper's 
claims in this case, I have personal knowledge of the events surrounding these claims. 
3. On or about Octobej>fTl998, David Nipper and I stopped by the Rjemember When car 
lor and discussed with Richard Niohols the procedure for consigning a car to the lot. David 
Nipper was Interested in consigning his 1957 black Chevrolet. In this meeting, David Nipper 
explained to Nichols that he was going out of tlbe state for a while and that he would have his son, 
myself, act as his agent in the sale of the vehicle 
4. On or about October 15,1998,1 brought David's 1957 Chevy to Remember When and 
completed a consignment sale contract The contract provided that Remember When would pay 
David Nipper a minimum of $22,000 after the successful sale of his car. The contract also 
provided that Remember When would provide funds to David Nipper within 21 days of the sale. 
5. In reliance upon these representations,, I signed the contract on behalf of David Nipper. 
Richard A. Nichols signed on behalf of Remember When. In early March of 1999, 
I checked the Remember When showroom and discovered that the 1957 Chevy was missing. 
None of the people at the shop could tell me where the car was or whether it had been sold. Over a 
series of days and visits to Remember When, I finally learned that the vehicle had been sold on or 
about January 26,1999. 
6.1 demanded payment and was then rebuffed by Remember When, who came up with 
one excuse after another for not paying David Nipper for his share of the vehicle sale. 
•2-
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Finally, Remember When provided me with a check for $22,000., representing to me that the 
check was valid, that it would be honored at its bank, and that the check represented ftill payment 
for the sale of David Nipper's vehicle. 
7. In good faith reliance upon Remember When's representations regarding the 122,000 
check, I presented the check to Remember When's Bank. The obeck, however, was not honored 
by Remember When's bank. It was reported to me that there were insufficient funds in the 
Remember When account. Additional telephone calls to the bank showed that there was never 
enough money in the account to cover the check. Finally, a few days later, I called the bank and 
found that Remember When had placed a stop payment on the check. 
8. Subsequent telephone calls with Remember When yielded deceitthl and misleading 
excuses for the failure to honor the check including an allegation that I was an impostar and that 
there was a defect with the title. 
9. The preceding statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information 
and belief, and if called as a witness in this matter I would so testify. 
' . day of September, 2000. 
uMK3 
Paul Nipper 7 / 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before mo this o ? / day o f \ y p L r i J b k Afiflfl 
Notaijf^ ublic
 m Q 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
NotaiyPubMo " " " T 
VERONICA J0LLEY | 
224 North NwSttrDiH* . 
Salt lake City. Utah 6*11* I 
MyCororobf)onE)qp*oa • 
May £1.2001 I 
SiaieolUtah J 
•3-
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ADDENDUM B 
1 ^ ' 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Richard Anthony Nichols, 
Defendant and Appellant 
ORDER 
Case No. 20020686-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood and Thome. 
This matter is before the court upon Appellant's motion, 
filed June 5, 2003 to supplement the record on appeal with 
Exhibit B, an affidavit of a witness that testified at trial. 
Appellee stipulated to the motion. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the record on appeal shall be 
supplemented with Exhibit B, submitted by Appellant. 
Dated thisj*y£ day of June, 2003. 
FOR THE COURT: 
